#REVENUE SHARING IN 1994 MLB STRIKE FREE#

(I always envision the owners psyching themselves up like some high school football team, but over scotch at some posh club instead of a grimy locker room. This time, the owners promised themselves, things would be different. Baseball had seen seven previous work stoppages, and in each case, the owners blinked first. These losses doomed Pittsburgh to 20 years of sub-.500 baseball.īy the 1990s, the owners were ready to go to the mattress over player salaries (for more on this case, see Ken Burn’s excellent documentary Baseball: Top of the Tenth).

By 1993, however, the Pirates lost three of their biggest stars to free agency-Bonilla to the Mets ($39 million for five years), 19 NL MVP Barry Bonds to the Giants ($43.75 million for six years), and 1990 Cy Young winner Doug Drabek to the Astros ($19.5 million for four). The Pittsburg Pirates, for example, won the NL East three years in a row to start the 1990s on the strength of a talented young roster. Moreover, baseball was the only major sport without a revenue-sharing agreement, which convinced many small-market owners that they could not compete with their big market competitors. Twenty years later, the average salary was $1.2 million, and Bobby Bonilla was making $6.3 million a year playing for the Mets-a 2,500% increase over Aaron’s salary (amazingly, Bonilla will get $500,000 a year from the Mets until he is 72). Before free agency, Hank Aaron was MLB’s highest-paid player at $240,000. MLB owners had complained about the astronomical rise in baseball salaries since the introduction of free agency in December of 1975 (see figure below).

Finally, Clinton’s case provides an object lesson for American presidents: never invest political capital in sports unless you can guarantee success. Clinton had no legal authority to settle the strike, and his rhetorical efforts of “going public” failed miserably. Second, presidents have surprisingly limited power to make changes in the sporting world. Presidential involvement is usually little more than fan talk (see “The Sports Talk Presidency”), but, sometimes, presidents get off the sidelines and try to use their power to make changes in the sporting world. First, presidents like to be part of the game. The story of Clinton and the 1994-95 MLB strike illustrates several things about the presidency and sports. To add insult to injury, Clinton then had to watch as another branch of the federal government, the judiciary, settled the strike. Finally, the White House conceded defeat the American president is no match for the likes of Bud Selig and Oral Hershiser. Congress, that this was the way to resolve the strike. He then proposed legislation and set about convincing the American public, and, by extension, the U.S. Clinton first promised to “lock” the owners and players in the White House until they hashed out a deal, while publicly shaming both sides into making that agreement. Owners and players were at loggerheads over a proposed salary cap and revenue-sharing agreement, and, at the time, nothing seemed like it could break the deadlock. The Complete GameĪn MLB strike wiped out what was shaping up to be an incredible 1994 season and delayed the start of the 1995 season. This case illustrates the limited powers of the president and the difficulty presidents face when “going public” on sports.

District Judge Sonia Sotomayor cited owners for unfair labor practices. The strike ended on March 21, 1995, when then-U.S. That didn’t work.Ĭlinton then introduced his “Major League Baseball Restoration Act” and “went public” to pressure Congress into passing the legislation. President Bill Clinton failed in his attempt to resolve the 1994-95 Major League Baseball strike.Ĭlinton first attempted to shame the owners and players into an agreement.

#REVENUE SHARING IN 1994 MLB STRIKE FREE#

Revenue sharing in 1994 mlb strike